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Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.It is well established that the social and economic environment of
medical care distinguishes its provision from that of other goods and
1,7,11 services. While scholars have studied the influences of this idio-
syncratic environment, there is relatively little empirical knowledge about
how it affects decision—making in specific medical contexts. Through general
conceptual discussion and consideration of a case study of leukemia chemo-
therapy, this paper examines the medical decision—making process in one
specific context: the response of physicians to the availability of an
innovative treatment for a catastrophic illness. The manner in which the
medical profession deals with serious illness is relevant to concerns as
diverse as the promotion of economic efficiency and the preservation of human
dignity.
Decision—Making with Respect to Innovation
A decision—making problem may be modeled as follows: the decision—maker
has an objective function which specifies how quantities of identified inputs
interact to produce quantities of the objective. The decision—maker chooses
the quantities and mix of inputs to achieve as much of the objective as possible
subject to existing constraints.
In an environment of readily available information and complete knowledge
(of relevant production technologies, etc.), decision—makingmay be reduced to
to a mechanistic process. The human element enters when there is risk or
uncertainty, as in the decision whether or not to use an innovation. In this
case, the decision—maker must make imperfect judgments on relationships and out-
comes (uncertainty) or must weigh and value the risk associated with the
possibility of a variety of outcomes. Even if they possess similar information
and knowledge, different decision—makers willvary in their assessments of the—2—
likelihood of alternative outcomes; in addition they will differentially value
anticipated risk. Consequently, they may arrive at different decisions, or
they may arrive at similar decisions but following varying periods of deliberation.
These differences will be accentuated by variations in the timing and quantity
of information acquisition.
The literature on response to innovation offers several insights into the
5,6,8,9,10,16 factors influencing decision—makers responses to innovation.
Central among these are the following:
—Decision—makerstend to adopt innovations more rapidly the greater the
innovation's perceived relative advantages, the smaller the investment it requires
(in terms of physical capital, learning of new skills, etc.), the greater its
8,10,16 testability, the less its technical complexity, and so on.
—Decision—makerstend to be risk averse. Caution dictates the wisdom
of adopting a "wait—and--see" attitude in order to avoid the hazards of risk
and uncertainty. The late adopter of an innovation may reap some of the
benefits of early users' costly experimentation. "[Pjotential users.. .have an
incentive to let others try [innovations] first and identify the defects," as
well as establish the potential profitability. Even in the highly competitive
arena of economic activity, firms demonstrate considerable risk aversion and
conservatism in their: approath' to innovations.9
—Partlyas a consequence of this risk aversion, It appears that the
probability that nonusers will adopt an innovation is an increasing function of
the proportion of their peers (colleagues or competitors) who are already using
the innovation.8 This imitation phenomenon reflects both the prima facie
positive evidence implicit in the fact of growing usage by peers and the
increasing availability of objective evidence about the innovation's relative—3—
advantages and deficiencies. Such evidence increases knowledge of how to
best use the innovation and decreases uncertainty about the results of using
it. Risk aversion and imitation are responsible for the frequently documented
S—shaped innovation diffusion pattern wherein diffusion is initially gradual and
then accelerates •15
In short, an innovation will be used if it contributes cost—effectively
to the realization of the decision—maker's objective. The risk and uncertainty
inherent in most innovations generally act as deterrents to rapid adoption in
a population of risk averse potential users. One possible exception merits
attention here because of its relevance to medical treatment decision—making.
An organization which finds itself in a dismal situation (e.g., a firm verging
on bankruptcy) maybehighly reponsive to an innovation. The organization's
fiscal (or other) condition triggers a search for a new means of assuring
survival, existing techniques having failed. To a successful (profitable)
organization, use of an innovation implies the risk of damaging the status quo,
in addition to the possibility of enhancing success. To the organization whose
survival is in jeopardy, an innovation offers the hope of improvement, while
downside risk is low by definition.
The Environment of Catastrophic Illness Care
The physician with a seriously ill patient often faces a decision—making
problem analytically similar to that of the entrepreneur or manager of a near—
bankrupt firm:confrontedwith imminent demise ——ofthe patient or the firm——
thedecision—maker has a strong inducement to use an innovation which might alter
the status quo, assuming that the innovation does not impose substantial costs
which the decision—maker will have to bear. (An entrepreneur might rationally—4—
.
chooseto accept existing losses rather than risk incurring additional
liabilities.)
An entrepreneur confronts the serious possibility of the demise of a firm
infrequently and rarely repeatedly; repeated confrontations would generally lead
to the firm's bankruptcy. In contrast, physicians routinely deal with dire
medical situations in which remissions or cures are impossible or highly
improbable, given existing therapies. For a number of reasons, physicians are
permitted and encouraged to use innovative therapies even before the therapies'
efficacy has been demonstrated and largely irrespective of their cost. A
physician's decision to use a poorly understood innovation may well be individually
rational in the face of a likely death or serious impairment. At the same time,
the social desirability of widespread adoption may remain open to question.
Use of expensive new therapies of unknown efficacy is permitted by the
unorthodox economic environment in which catastrophic illness care is delivered.
In the present context, the most important of the market imperfections and idio-
syncrasies which pervade medical care17fl is the severance of the conventional
bond between consumption of a good or service and financial liability. Wide-
spread insurance coverage imposes the liability for most catastrophic illness
care on third parties, private and public insurers. When the patient's insurance
coverage and other resources are inadequate, individual or institutional price
discrimination may pass costs on to other patients. In short, the financial
constraint on consumption is effectively removed from the delivery of catastrophic
illness care. Patients' demand for care is economically unconstrained and, of
greater importance, physicians acting as demand agents for their patients
(discussed below) need not be concerned about the financial implications of
S—5—
their demand decisions.
Use of new therapies is encouraged by a variety of factors. One is
the tendency of the physician—patient trust relationship to foster "Cadillac
care":
Delegation and trust are the social institutions designed to obviate
the problem of informational inequality. .. [Tihepatient must delegate
to the physician much of his freedom of choice. He does not have the
knowledge to make decisions of treatment, referral, or hospitalization.
To justify this delegation, the physician finds himself somewhat limited...
The safest course to take to avoid not being a true agent is to give
the socially prescribed 'best' treatment of the day. Compromise in
quality, even for the purpose of saving the patient money, is to risk
an imputation of failure to live up to the social bond.'
In the case of catastrophic illness, "best" treatment usually implies
the physician's taking some positive therapeutic action, often irrespective
of its efficacy. Medicine's general pro—therapy bias4 is strongly reinforced
by reactions to a desperate situation: patients feel comforted by medical
attention, however technically ineffective it may be; and beyond their agency
role, physicians apparently deal with their ownsenseof frustration or impotence
by "taking action." "[Pjhysicians.. .get nervous about not treating... It is
difficult to do nothing; [they] are neither trained nor conditioned for it...
How should one behave when nil desperandum collides with primum non nocere?"
Physicians are trained to follow therapeutic leads set either by top
experts or by their immediate colleagues. The medical research/education
establishment fosters imitative behavior ——andinnovative behavior ——atthe
earliest stages in the training of physicians. Governmentally and privately
subsidized research is housed, in the main, in and around educational centers;
hence medical students are exposed to, and often participate in, work on the
frontiers of clinical medicine. The students' role models are Innovators.—6—
.
Modernitymay become a goal in itself; at a minimum, it is viewed as producing
professional respect. The innovative propensity is passed on to each
generation of medical students, which attempts to establish its superiority
over preceding generations by becoming more technically sophisticated. This
creates a demand for medical research and its products. Through the professional
literature and seminars and meetings, practitioners who have completed their
formal training are supplied with information on, and encouraged to keep up
with, recent developments.
Imitative behavior may or may not be accompanied by a thorough understanding
of the medical problem, or of the therapy. For specific decision—making purposes,
imitative behavior tends to be substituted for comprehensive personal under-
standing most commonly when the costs of waiting for such understanding
are perceived as too high. If the prognosis for an illness is a few days
of mild fever and nausea, there is no compelling reason for a physician
to prescribe a drug about which very little is known; in fact, the danger of
toxicities is a compelling reason not to prescribe the drug. If, however, the
prognosis is imminent death, the relative risks of trying a novel and
promising therapy are small. In other words, the worse the prognosis, the less
is the risk differential between trying and not trying the therapy. The former
may introduce uncertainty and variance in the outcome, but a not unreasonable
assumption is that both the uncertainty and the variance are desirable relative
to the near—certainty outcome of not trying the therapy. From the physician's
perspective, the only "cost" of using a technique which proves to be a failure
is that things are not better. There Is no counterpart in medicine to the
financial risk accepted by the business entrepreneur who decides to use an
innovation. S
Inshort, in dealing with catastrophic illness, physicians have powerful
incentives to try any therapy which is available and few financial deterrents—7—
to doing so. In a fundamental sense, the major constraint is the technology
itself, the "state of the art."
A Model of Treatment Decision—Making in Leukemia
Leukemia and Its Therapy
The leukemias are cancers of the blood. Acute leukemia is the leading
childhood cancer, though leukemias kill many more adults than children. Prior
to the late 1940s, these diseases had not responded to any therapy. With the
development of the early anti—cancer drugs, physicians had a relatively easy
method of treating leukemias, a method whose initial successes in inducing
remissions in leukemic children provided reason for optimism. Since the 1940s,
physicians have experimented with an arsenal of drugs ——individually,in
combination, with varying dosages and timing of dosages ——andthey have
achieved mixed results. Only one of the four leukemias considered in the study
reported below ——theacute leukemia of childhood ——yieldedsignificant ground
to drug therapy during the two decades following its first use. Yet large
percentages of each of these four closely related diseases have long received
chemotherapy. (Many of the victims of chronic leukemia are treated only for
symptomatic relief. Chemotherapy of the acute leukemias is virtually always
administered with the goal of remission or cure.) Table 1 presents distinguishing
characteristics of these leukemias.
The Model
As noted earlier, a decision to use or not to use an innovation is
generally based on the contribution that that innovation is expected to make




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































use. A mechanistic view of the physician—qua—demand—agent for the patient
would suggest that the physician's objective is to improve the health or
*
comfortof the patient.Thus, the decision of whether or not to use a
therapy would rest on a comparison of the expected health improvement with
the anticipated costs of the therapy, both economic and medical (e.g., risk of
suffering due to toxicities).
Of course, as observed above, other factors may complicate the decision—
making: in a medically desperate situation, physicians may not have sufficient
information to predict the costs and benefits of using a treatment, yet they
may still choose to administer the therapy for reasons that are both rational
and emotional. The rational component is recognition that risk anduncertainty
may be desirable when the certainty outcome of not using the treatment is near—
term death, severe morbidity, or incapacitating disability. The emotional
component is the compelling need felt by many physicians to "do something,
anything" when confronted with a dire medical situation, even if that something
has virtually no chance of improving the situation andmay even cause suffering.3'4
Physicians cannot know precisely how a given therapy will affect a given
patient. What they can do is observe certain variables and then estimate an
*
Thedecisions of whether or not to treat a seriously ill patient, and if
so how, are generally made by the physician in charge of the case. This
is not to suggest a lack of consultation with the patient, but rather
recognizes the critical importance of the trust relationship in the situation:
not only must the patient rely on physicians for reasons of technical
knowledge, but in addition many patients and their families are relieved
to have someone else take responsibility for such serious, potentially
emotional decisions. Thus, the decision—making process focuses on the
physician. The patient's role is mostly passive, though there are exceptions:
for religious or other non—economic reasons, the patientmay overrule a
physician's decision or recommendation, an occurrence not considered in the
analysis which follows; or conventional economic demand factors may come
into play. Acknowledging these exceptions, and recognizing that the patient
Is the ultimate consumer of the therapy, this is primarily an analysis of
physician decision—making.—9—
.
outcomefor a patient, both with and without use of the treatment In question.
To the extent that physicians accurately perceive the roles of these variables
in influencing health improvement, and to the extent that the improvement of
their patient's health is their sole objective, one would expect variables
significant in influencing positive treatment decisions to be correlated with
improved health status. If the variables which influence treatment decisions
did not play significant roles In affecting the patient's health, this would
suggest either that the physicians did not understand the effects of certain
variables on health improvement, and hence relied on other considerations, or
else that health improvement was not the sole objective motivating use/rejection
decisions.
In comparing the medical treatment decision—making process with conventional
decision—making, it is useful to think of classes of relevant variables which
play the roles identified in the general discussion of decision—making. Thus
we need to identify a variable indicative of the decision—maker's objective,
and a set of factors involved in the production or realization of the objective,
including both technical inputs and constraints. Each of these categories is
discussed briefly below. The specific variables employed in the empirical
analysis are enumerated and defined in Table 2.
The objective. For many not—for—profit activities, the objective
function is either multi—dimensional or ill—defined. In the treatment of
catastrophic illness, the primary objective is "improved health." This may
mean objective physical improvement ——forexample, disease remission or
increased survival time ——orit may refer to the easing of suffering, both







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































recognize that one objective of the physician decision—maker may be to
reduce his or her own psychological discomfort; administering therapy may
partially achieve this objective, irrespective of its effects on the patient's
health status.3
In the case of the acute leukemias, the principal goal of chemotherapy
is to increase the patient's survival time. This is the only objective
explicitly quantified. However, other objectives can be ascertained from the
analysis. They are discussed in the next section of the paper.
Inputs and constraints. The production or attainment of increased
survival time is a function of the knowledge of the medical personnel delivering
care, the technology available to them, and the condition of the patient.
Knowledge can be obtained both from personal experience and from non—experiential
sources (the professional literature, seminars, etc.). The technology consists
both of facilities and equipment specific to the therapy and of general
facilities for supportive therapy.
Production of increased survival time is fundamentally constrained by the
state of the art, the capability of the best therapy administered under optimal
conditions. In a given case, the ability of therapy to enhance survival time
depends on the individual patient's condition: the older the patient, the more
advanced the disease, the less effective will be the therapy. Finally, economic
factors can act as a constraint either on the fact of therapy or on itsquality,
by affecting the demand of either the patient or the physician.
The conceptual model is as follows:
(1) SUR f(X ,...,x ) 1 1 n
(2) TREATi =1if E(SURi)SURJ
=0if E(SURi) <
SURi—11—
Equation (1) says that the objective, survival time (SUR1), is a function of a
series of variables (identif led in Table 2). Equation (2) says that a physician
will choose to administer chemotherapy to patient i if the expected value of
patient i's survival time (E(SUR1)) equals or exceeds some threshold value
(SUR1*).
SUR. may vary from physician to physician and even among patients for
a given physician. In addition, for individual patients, physicians can only
guess at E(SUR1), and the variance is so large that the expected value is not
only very difficult to determine but also not necessarily very meaningful. It
seems more likely that physicians' treatment decisions are influenced by individual
observable variables which they believe to be associated with health improvement.
For this reason, and in order to explore other influences on the treatment
decision besides objective health improvement, both the survival time and the
treatment decision—making equations are specified independently as functions of
a similar set of variables. (The variables are identical except that the
decision—making equation includes the variables with the "AL" prefix in order
to allow for the possibility of "cue—borrowing," a phenomenon discussed in the
next section.)* This approach permits comparison of the roles of individual
*
Theoreticallythe survival time equation should include measurement of
the fact and nature of treatment as independent variables. This study's only
relevant variable, TREAT1, was excluded for the following reasons:
During the period studied, the medical evidence demonstrates that chemo-
therapy for other than childhood ALL did not increase survival time. The use of
drugs for symptomatic relief in the sicker chronic leukemia patients, who died
earlier, would lead to a spurious negative correlation between TREAT1 and SUR1
For childhood acute leukemia (ALL), treatment definitely did increase
survival time. However, problems in the data set recommended against including
TREATi.Specifically, TREAT1 iscollinear with other important variables. Its
inclusion in regressions masks the effects of variables like TECHt whose influences
need to be observed to compare the determinants of the treatment decision with
these variables' roles in the production of survival time,
Secondly, survival time in ALL is highly dependent on the specifics
of the chemotherapy administered. By the early l960s, virtually every child
with ALL received chemotherapy, yet there were great disparities in the types
and qualities of therapies. TREAT1 misses these subtleties completely.—12--
independent variables in influencing survival time and the physician's
decision to administer or to withhold chemotherapy.
(1') SUR1 =a0 +aAGEi+ a2HOS.÷a3PVTPT.
+ a4ART+ a5PCTt1+ a6 MST2
+ a7TECH+
*
(2') TREAT. = + AGE. +HOS + PVTPT.
i 0 1 1 2 i 3 i
+ 4ART + 5 PCTt_l + 6 MSTt 2 + 37 TECHt




The primary source of data for the empirical study was the Connecticut
Tumor Registry of the Connecticut State Department of Health. This Registry is
a unique resource, containing data on all reported cases of cancer among the
residents of the entire state dating from 1935. The present study examined all
cases of the four leukeniias diagnosed from 1947 through 1968, excluding some
**
incompleterecords and cases falling outside of prespecified age categories.
*
TECHtis included only for ALL, while the variables with the prefix
"AL" are included only for AML, CLL, and CML.
**
Fordetails on these and the other data ——theirnature, problems, and
deficiencies ——andon the diseases and their therapies, see reference 14.—13--
.
Table3 presents regression results fitting the data to the survival
time equation (1'), using a limited dependent variable regression package.
Tables 4 and 5 present Probit analysis fits to the treatment decision
equation (2'). Table 4 excludes the ALL variables from the regressions for
the other leukemias, thus yielding a set of variables identical to those of
the survival time equation. Table 5 includes the ALL variables. The limitations
imposed by data availability and quality are substantial, yet these results
permit several generalizations.
From Table 3, we see that the only clear determinants of survival time
are the patient's condition (represented here by the single variable, AGEi) and
the technical capability of the therapy (represented by the state of the art
median survival, TECHt, measured only for childhood acute leukemia; recall that
the state of the art ——interms of increasing survival time ——didnot change
significantly for the other leukemias throughout the period studied). The near—
significant coefficients of PCTt1 suggest that some learning—by—doing may
havebeen occurring, but this effect is not pronounced. (The coefficients imply
small elasticities at the means, ranging from —0.17 for CLL to 0.55 for AML.)
The nonsignificance and suggested negative tendency of the study's sole
indicator of the quality of facilities and personnel for administering chemo-
therapy (HOS1) probably reflect the fact that many patients were treated first
at "lower quality" hospitals and then, after therapeutic failure, were transferred
to one of the "higher quality" hospitals. Patients were reported as having
been in one of the high quality hospitals if during the course of the disease
they were ever in one of them. Hence the average physical condition of patients
.—13 a—
TABLE 3. Determinants of Survival Time
(Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic t statistics)
Variable
Disease



































































Ages (inyears) 0—19 20—98 40—98 20—98
N 268 752 693 419
df 7 6 6 6
—2 in X 91.37 20.90 62.38 39.53
(A is the likelihood ratio. —2 in A is distributed chi—square with degrees
of freedom equal to the number of variables, including the constant term, minus
1.)-13b—
TABLE 4. Determinants of the Treatment Decision,
Excluding the ALL Variables From the AML, CLL, and CML Equations



































































Ages(in years) 0—19 20—98 40—98 20—98
N 268 752 693 419
df 7 6 6 6
—2inA 73.35 118.08 52.99 78.79
(A is the likelihood ratio. —2 in A is distributed chi—square with degrees




TABLE 5. Determinants of the Treatment Decision,
Including the ALLVariables




CONSTANT —.695 —.685 .191
(—2.17) (—1.32) (0.38)
AGE —.016 —.012 —.013
(—4.92) (—2.54) (—2.85)
HOS. .356 .357 .561
(3.25) (3.18) (3.77)
PVTPT .124 —.239 .386
(0.88) (—1.80) (2.21)





.138 —.100 .005 t (0.31) (—0.13) (0.01)
MST .020 .003 —.031
t—2
(0.17) (0.34) (—2.32)
ALART —.037 —.050 —.032
t
(—2.22) (—2.78) (—1.07)
ALPCTt1 2.497 1.672 1.121
(4.88) (3.28) (1.71)
ALMST—2 —.045 —.054 .019
t
(—1.67) (—1.96) (0.49)
ALTECH .035 .045 .026
t (2.05) (2.16) (0.94)
Ages(in years) 20—98 40—98 20—98
N 752 693 419
df 10 10 10
—2inA 147.91 69.97 84.22
(A is the likelihood ratio. —2 in A is distributed chi—square with degrees
of freedom equal to the number of variables, including the constant term, minus
1.)—14—
.
inthe higher quality hospitals was probably much poorer than that of the
average patient in the state. Unfortunately, the data did not permit separation
of these influences.
The economic factor (PVTPT) is not important in the determination of
survival time. This fact is of most interest in the case of childhood acute
leukemia, the one leukemia for which chemotherapy significantly increases longevity.
The tentative implication of this analysis is that ability to pay for an expensive
therapy does not influence outcome for a child seriously ill with leukemia.
Implicitly, this suggests that the economic factor Is not important In the
determination of receipt of therapy, nor in the quality of therapy administered
as measured by outcome. This is corroborated by the analysis of treatment
decision—making, discussed below. The one instance in which soclo—economic status
is associated with greater longevity ——chroniclymphocytic leukemia in middle—
aged and elderly adults ——probablyreflects the fact that more affluent patients
are generally healthier (for reasons of diet, habits, etc.). This interpretation
is also supported by analysis of the treatment decision—making findings.
Comparison with the above of the results presented in Tables 4 and 5
sheds considerable light on the determinants of the decision to administer drug
therapy to or to withhold it from the victims of leukemia.
While the technical capability of ALL therapy (TECH) had an obvious
impact on survival outcomes, its influence on actual treatment decisions is
not of comparable importance. Combined with the nonsignificance of the measures
of recent state—wide achievement (MST_2) and of professional scientific
.—15—
interest (as reflected in number of journal publications, ARTt),* this
suggests that the effectiveness of therapy was of less direct consequence in
childhood leukemia treatment decisions than other considerations. This find-
ing is consistent with the conventional wisdom4 and is supported by other
results discussed below.
The patient's condition and personal characteristics, representedby
AGEi, play a role in the determination of both outcome and the treatment dec-
ision, though not necessarily for identical reasons. The patient's condition
does have an objective impact on survival expectations andresponse to therapy.
Physicians might be responding to this objective consideration in making
therapy decisions, but in addition they may be responding to the subjective
impact of having to deal with seriously ill patients. The desire to treat ——
tointervene in a situation with a dire prognosis ——maybe greater the more
desperate the physician feels the situation to be. Quite naturally, a terminal
illness in a child would generally be considered more tragic than terminalill-
ness in an elderly person; similarly for a middle—aged adult as contrasted with
a very old one. Indeed, while relative youth is associated with longer sur-
vival in all the leukemias, it is medically well—established thattherapy per
se did not increase survival expectations in other than childhood leukemia
through the period studied. Thus the tendency for physicians to treat their
younger ANL, CLL, and ML patients would seem to indicate reaction to a sense
13 of desperation.
*
Thenonsignificance of ARTt may reflect the way in which this variable
was measured, rather than the phenomenon it was intended to measure.However,
there is substantial evidence in the literature that the scientificand popular
press may provide information about an innovation, but more personal contacts,
e.g., colleagues' experiences with the treatment, have more significant in-
fluence in actual adoption decisions.2—16—
.
Thenonsignificance of AGE1 In the childhood ALL treatment decision
regression may reflect either of two considerations and probably reflects
both: first, while younger children fare better with therapy than do teen—
agers,nearly all children realize additional survival time as the result of
therapy; even the relatively small increment in survival time realized by
the older children may be enough to justify treatment in the minds of most
physicians. Second, physicians view terminal illness in a child of age
as being a tragic event. The treatment of afflicted children of all ages may
represent an attempt by physicians to alleviate their sense of impotence or
desperation.
For all four leukemias it is clear that chemotherapy was administered
more often in hospitals equipped and staffed to deliver high quality therapy.
This is not surprising. Physicians at the better hospitals tend to believe in
and be experienced with cancer chemotherapy; they tend to keep up with new
developments in therapy; hence, ceteris paribus, patients who consult them are
more likely to receive therapy than are individuals who consult physicians in
or affiliated with other hospitals. In addition, especially in the case of acute
leukemia, general practitioners or internists are often reluctant to treat;
instead they will refer the patient to a specialist, who usually practices in
one of the better hospitals.
The treatment decision equations permit some intriguing though highly
tentative conjectures about the role of ability to pay in the receipt of
therapy. For victims ot the acute leukemias it appears that treatment
decisions wereindependent of the patient's economic status (PVTPT1). Note
that the bulk of the period studied predates Medicare and Medicaid, so many of
the poorer patients were uninsured or very inadequately insured. While some—17—
leukemia therapy was funded by research grants, many of the poorer patients
must have been the beneficiaries of individual or institutional price
discrimination (redistribution). The important point is that the economic
factor did not bar seriously ill people from receiving potentially beneficial
therapy. The nonsignificance of economic status in the survival of children
with acute leukemia further suggests that the quality of therapy was not
significantly different.
The results for the chronic leukemias are somewhat more ambiguous but
admit to plausible interpretations. The negative coefficient estimate for
PVTPT. in the CLL regression probably reflects physicians administering the
CLL chemotherapy only to their sickest patients, who tend to come from lower
socio—economlc groups. This interpretation is consistent with the significant
positive coefficient estimate for PVTPT1 in the CLL survival time regression.
It is medically established that drug therapy did not significantly influence
survival time in CLL patients; hence the significance of the economic variable
must represent other, exogenous, factors. In the case of cML, a plausible
conclusion is that ability to pay did influence the decision to
administer drugs. As in CLL, CML drug therapy did not enhance survival
expectations; rather it could palliate, and with fewer significant deleterious or
discomfiting side effects than in CLL. Hence it appears that affluent CLL
patients may have demanded and bought therapy which was not administered as
frequently to poorer CML patients. Combined with the nonsignificance of
economic status in the acute leukemia treatment decisions, this suggests the
possibility that an approximation to conventional market behavior may character—
ize the demand for and provision of medical goods and services which either
are not highly effective or which relate to a medical condition which is not—18—
considered serious (i.e. threatening to lift or limb, Involving prolonged morbidity,
etc.). By contrast, for reasonably effective therapies addressing serious
medical problems (e.g., acute leukemia therapy), conventional market forces
may often be inoperative.
The results involving the direct measure of quantity of recent experience
with chemotherapy within the state (PCTt1) provide insight into the development
of medical therapy trends. According to the survival equations (Table 3),
experience per se did not necessarily convey useful learning to prac-
titioners (defining "useful" as an Improvement in outcomes). However,
when the dichotomous treatment decision variable was regressed on the same set
of variables (Table 4), PCTt1 was invariably strongly statistically significant
for other than ALL; in addition, its quantitative Importance (coefficients
relative to the magnitudes of the dependent variables) is considerably greater
for the treatment decision. The inference is that there was a distinct trend
phenomenon in which physicians followed their colleagues' therapeutic leads
despite the lack of resultant improvement in their patients' survival expectations.
For innovations in most settings, a comparable pattern of imitative behavior,
with its consequent substantial diffusion, generally would require effective
demonstration of the innovation's relative advantage (technical superiority,
profitability, etc.).
The trend phenomenon takes on a new dimension when one compares Tables
4 and 5. In Table 5 ——theregressions which include the ALL variables in
the decision equations of the other leukemias ——PCTt1is clearly nonsignifi-
cant, in striking contrast to Table 4. However, in Table 5 the corresponding
ALL variable (ALPCTt1) is significantly correlated withTREAT1, as
is the measure of the ALL state of the art (ALTECH) .Inother words, S—19—
in cases of leukemia other than the childhood variant, the decision to administer
drug therapy appears to have been significantly affected by the recent trend
(both quantity of experience and degree of success) in administering chemo-
therapy to the victims of the childhood disease. Indeed, the amount of ALL
experience clearly dominated the influence of the disease's own trend (PCTi).
In a sense, the trend in the treatment of the childhood disease ——theone
successful leukemia chemotherapy ——diffusedto the handling of the other
leukemias. This effect was notably stronger for AML and CLL than it was for
CNL,a predictable result as AML and CLL are more closely related to ALL (by
disease severity and by cell type, respectively) than is CML. This provides
support for the concept of "cue—borrowing" in treatment decision—making:
following the more successful treatment trends for similar therapies in closely
related diseases. Apparently indirect success influenced physicians' leukemia
treatment decisions more than did direct failure. This is consistent with the
apparent need felt by physicians to take positive therapeutic action in caaes
of serious illness.
Conclusion
Conclusions drawn on the basis of this empirical study must be accom-
panied by several caveats: this is a case study, one whose generalizability
remains to be established; and the data are imperfect, as is the modeling.
Still, the findings provide strong suggestive evidence for several tentative
conclusions.
The principal general observation is that, at least in the case of
catastrophic illness, the medical decision—making process with respect to the—20—
use or nonuse of an innovation does differ from the process which occurs in
other settings which have been studied. This is a function of the compelling
nature of many medical situations and of the unorthodox, relatively uncon-
strained economic environment in which individual use/nonuse decisions are
made. Manifestations of the difference in decision—making processes include
the following:
—Inthe dire medical situation, decision—makers are less cautious or
conservative in deciding to use an innovation than would be more conventional
market decision—makers. The former seem to require less proof of efficacy
(relative advantage) than the latter. Indeed, the usual market usage decision
is predicated almost exclusively on the expected contribution of the innovation
to the firm's profitability, while in the medical setting both the inherent
merits of the therapy (the analog to profitability) and themedical situation
itself influence usage decisions. That is, as illustrated by the case study,
a desperate medical situation may promote use of a therapy irrespective of its
efficacy. Thus, other things being equal, diffusion of an innovation may be
more rapid or extensive in the desperate medical context than in the conventional
market.
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—Evenin the instance of the firm verging on bankruptcy ——perhapsthe
closest market analog to the catastrophic illness situation ——innovation
adoption is not costless. While such a firm might be more receptive to
innovation than a more stable firm, its entrepreneur must weigh the potentially
significant costs of using the innovation against its anticipated benefits. A
decision not to use an innovation, and thus to accept near—certain dissolution,
might well be rational. In an important respect, the Costs to both physicians—21—
and patients of therapeutic failure with the medical innovation are very
limited, given the near certainty of death, severe disability, etc. without
using the Innovation and the absence of direct financial implications attached
to use. This would seem to account in part for physicians' preference for
an active therapy, and their apparent inability to consider "doing nothing"
as a viable option in cases of serious illness.
—Physiciansmay place more emphasis on indirect encouraging evidence about
a therapy than on direct discouraging information. This was suggested by the
"cue—borrowing" phenomenon In leukemia chemotherapy in which physicians appear
to have based therapy decisions for ANL, CLL, and CML more on the successful
trends in ALL treatment than on the disappointing results of these diseases'
own therapies. Such "cue—borrowing" may be an important determinant of the
development of many treatment trends in medicine.
In sum, in a conventional market environment an innovation must demon-
strate its superiority to alternatives, including using nothing, in order to
be accepted by a large segment of the population it is designed to benefit. In
a dire medical situation, the innovation's preferredness may be assumed until
demonstrated otherwise. I am not arguing that this is irrational or undesirable;
In a desperate situation, use of an unknown quantity may indeed by logically
preferable to the dismal outcome associated with other approaches. Rather,
I wish to emphasize the existence of differences in decision environments
and hence in decision outcomes, and the concomitant implications for the
allocation of resources both within medicine and among sectors.
In an important sense, much of medical decision—making, and hence
behavior, is constrained by technology and by the state of knowledge rather—22—
than by conventional economic considerations. We live in an era in which
medical knowledge is changing rapidly and new understanding Is frequently
accompanied by a profusion of new technology and technique. Not all of
these technical changes are necessarily worth their cost,12 yet they are not
forced to survive orthodox market tests. As both existing and proposed
legislation promise to remove the delivery of medical care even further from
the conventional marketplace, we must develop an understanding of decision—
making within the medical marketplace so that we may determine the rules and
regulations by which It should governed.—23—
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